Paper Example. Runway Overrun of a Canadair Regional Jet

Runway overrun of a Canadair Regional jet was an accident that occurred on April 12, 2007, involving the Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19 which is operated as the Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712. Broadly, the jet ran past the departure end of the runway immediately after landing at the Cherry Capital Airport. While reports revealed that there were no serious injuries or fatalities among the 49 passengers on board, the plane was highly damaged. Initial assessments showed that the snowing weather could significantly contribute to the accident. It is critical to note that this airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. All the weather monitoring operations were in place when the accident occurred (NTSB, 2008).

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While it is evident that the initial assessment of the probable cause of the accident was the weather, the National Transport and Safety Board (NTSB) was able to provide a comprehensive determination of the possible cause of the accident (NTSB, 2008). Notably, the NTSB established that the accident was contributed by the decision of the pilot to land the plane at the TVC without conducting a landing distance assessment as needed by the aviation regulation. The landing distance assessment is critical because of the runway contamination that had been reported earlier by the TVC grounds experts and operation personnel (NTSB, 2008). Ideally, the move not to perform a prior assessment was an example of poor decision-making that likely reflected the impact of fatigue on the part of the captain due to the long distance of travel and flying time. Additionally, the highly demanding aircraft activities for the pilot and the duties related to the check airman functions.

Thus, it was established that various parties, either directly or indirectly, contributed to the accident. These included the Federal Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations. Ideally, these regulations allowed the captain to operate and fly for a long time without rest. The fatigue thus emerged as a result leading to poor decision making. Secondly, the TVC operation personnel who utilized an abstruse and unspecific radio phraseology in the provision of the runway braking information (NTSB, 2008).

The NTSB, therefore, offered a conclusion that the airport operations manager used unnecessary and unfamiliar radio when giving the barking information. This affected the decision of the captain nit to make an accurate landing mechanism. The NSTB, therefore, believed that the FAA ought to provide a CertAlert to all the 14 CFR Part 139 certificated airports, which provided the definition that described the situation of the accident.

Role of the Crew in Accidents

Both the preliminary assessment of the possible cause of the accident revealed that the flights attendants, Maintenance, and Dispatch had little role in the accident occurred or any other events that preceded the accident. While the NTSB report showed that all the crew on board played their parts in line with the aviation regulations right away from the time the plane departed Minneapolis, Minnesota, to the accident time, it was indicated that they also had a hand in the accident. The published reference information about the TVC weather observations in the FAA and Pinnacle documents explicitly stated that the pilots were needed to get the weather information through the ASOS broadcast (NTSB, 2008).

Additionally, the interview after the accident, as well as the CVR evidence, revealed that the pilots were aware of the need to have such requirements as part of their flying obligations. As such, the captain was supposed to review the uncontrolled air operations and approaches with the first officer. However, the data collected from the CVR showed that the crew conducted the monitoring of the TVC ASOS weather information only once as opposed to periodically (Zhang, 2014).

The team only fulfilled this obligation 30 minutes before they landed their final destination (Rowney, 2016). . As such, they were unable to get more observation on their way towards their goal. It at this point that the pilots were able to know that the conditions were not conducive as advised by the operating personnel (NTSB, 2008). As such, the NTSB offered the conclusion that the failure of the crew to collect the correct weather data for the pilot made him unable to make informed lending decisions. They failed to use the TVC weather information continuously available to them through the TVC ASOS broadcast.

Role of Management Personnel in the Accident

It is critical to note that the management personnel played a crucial role in the accident, whether directly or indirectly. While the airport operations supervisor had fulfilled all the required qualifications and was significantly informed about the needed phraseology from his captain training, he failed to give the certain and specific information at the time of the accident. The NTSB report further showed the possibility of the TVC airport operation manager reticence yo confirm the chance of breaking the nil was a huge factor in the pilot's decision to continue the approach (NTSB, 2008).

The NTSB, therefore, offered a conclusion that the airport operations manager utilized unnecessary and unfamiliar radio when giving the barking information. This affected the decision of the captain nit to make the accurate landing mechanism. The NSTB, therefore, believed that the FAA ought to provide a CertAlert to all the 14 CFR Part 139 certificated Airport, which provided the definition that described the situation of the accident.

Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Measures

While the occurrence of the accident and the events that preceded it were not good in any way, the accident itself was vital in exposing some of the safety gaps that exist in our airports. It further showed that any simple mistakes before the plane land in an airport could be highly disastrous and fatal (Richards, 2008). One major lesson learned is that each party within the airline control system must perform his or her duty promptly while complying with aviation regulations and obligations. Additionally, poor decision-making can be dangerous. The NTSB thus offers several recommendations.

Firstly, the airport operation manager and crew must take into account the changing weather and runway conditions during the approach. Doing this will enable them to perform a landing distance calculation for a safe landing. The importance of certain critical radio communications is have been suggested by the NTSB to airports. This move would ensure that all the criteria and obligations are met to void any future accidents.

Based on the fact that weather patterns also contributed to this accident, the safety board suggested that the certificated airport operators should incorporate their appropriate and accurate snow and ice control report plan available to all the personnel that is involved in the dispatch of the right information about the contamination and runway friction assessments (Evans, 2015).

References

Evans, J. K. (2015). Differences in characteristics of aviation accidents during 1993-2012 based on aircraft type. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160002214.pdf

NTSB. (2008). Aircraft Accident Report Runway Overrun During Landing Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712. (Aircraft Accident Report No. NTSB/AAR-07/06). Washington, D.C.: National Transportation Safety Boa https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0802.pdf

Richards, R. E. (2008). U.S. Patent Application No. 11/859,276. https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/fd/ce/2a/6499af214cfa49/US20080215198A1.pdf

Rowney, P. A. (2016). A Situated Approach to Situation Awareness in Aircraft Accidents: A Case Study of Runway Overruns in Air Carrier Operations. Northcentral University.

Zhang, C. (2014). Improving Airport Runway Braking Analysis through Innovative Modeling (Master's thesis, University of Waterloo). https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/8574/Zhang_Cheng.pdf?sequence=1