China's SARS Epidemic: Political, Socioeconomic, & Health Impacts - Essay Sample

Introduction

As the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) spread across the world, its political, socioeconomic effects also spread around the globe. Researchers engaged in a survey to analyze the official reaction of the Chinese government to the epidemic. Besides, they assessed the public and political health impacts of how China recognized and dealt with the entire dynamics of the outbreak on national and universal levels and examined the short and long-term economic impact of SARS (Monaghan 11). The essential aspect of these studies entailed the acknowledgment of the severe stress SARS deployed on both the local and global health care arrangements and the distressful anticipation of future virulence or contagion (Monaghan 11). The purpose of this paper involves an examination of the history and economic impact of the SARS epidemic. Moreover, this paper aims to identify some parallels between SARS and COVID-19. Besides, this paper intends to assess the economic recovery following COVID-19.

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Origin of SARS

The first cases of SARS may have appeared in mid-November 2002 in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. The Chinese government and GOARN virologists, which reviewed studies of patients' records, indicate that the first case happened in Foshan city on the 16th of November, 2002 (Lau et al. 995). Original incidents occurred in seven municipalities. There exist no connections among the many epidemics traced so far, supporting the theory that the SARS virus moved from some animals to humans or other ecological reservoirs in southern China. Several of these initial infections remained small, with the highest series of transmission infecting twenty people.

Original accounts indicated a connection between cases and the management of wild animals apprehended, reared, and sold for human consumption. Present researches have revealed a virus genetically comparable to the SARS coronavirus in two animal kinds, the raccoon dog and the masked palm (Zhan 41). However, further studies can lead to a definite conclusion concerning the origins of SARS. The number of SARS cases started rising dramatically during the last week of January 2003, when admitted persons became the source of the rapid spread of the virus to health care employees, other patients, and visitors.

The Spread of SARS

On the 30th of January, 2003, an infected individual admitted in a hospital and successively got treatments from other health facilities, may have infected more than 91 people, with the subsequent secondary transmission of about 79 percent of the hospital employees the patient got into contact with (Monaghan 23). The epidemic reached its peak in the first fortnight of February. Over one thousand, five hundred and twelve cases got recorded in Guangdong that took its fullest toll on medical employees in urban health facilities. The pattern of spread happened in urban regions, with several instances concentrated in health facilities. Hospitals ensured the rapid spread of the virus, making the disease spread across the globe.

Some analysts suggest that SARS might have moved out of southern China on the 21st of February, 2003, when a medic from Guangdong treated patients and got infected. The doctor spent a night in Hong Kong, where he might have spread the disease to about 16 other guests and visitors. These guests and visitors then continued transmitting the disease as they traveled from one city to another, or from one country to the next, such as Vietnam, Toronto, and Singapore (Huat 77). Therefore, from a single visit to an only hotel, the virus spread across the globe. However, the Chinese government refused to report the Guangdong epidemic to the WHO up to the 11th of February, 2003. Rumors of the outbreak had begun spreading, but people thought the disease as an influenza infection.

Global Reaction to SARS

The Chinese authorities reported that the influenza outbreak in Guangdong and Beijing remained contained after a request from the WHO. After numerous concerns about the pandemic, the WHO notified its collaborative laboratories and initiated its influenza outbreak strategies (Heymann and Rodier 189). The Chinese administration initially refused to disclose to the WHO about the strange contagious disease to ensure that the public does not panic. After laboratory examinations, the WHO delivered an international alert concerning the symptoms and recommending isolation of people with symptoms like a pneumatic.

The WHO also gave notice on the procedures of infection control (Heymann and Rodier 191). Besides, WHO gave more substantial notification following the rapid escalation of the pandemic like emergency travel advisory, set out a case description, offered advice to international travelers should they show the same symptoms, and gave the emerging disease its name. The worldwide determination to contain SARS created exceptional demands on affected and unaffected nations to precisely isolate and document cases promptly. Moreover, the countries needed to collaborate with Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) professional teams of scientists and health care personnel organized by World Health Organization (WHO) and to sacrifice direct economic attention, such as trade, travel, and tourism (Heymann and Rodier 192).

Without global legal responsibility to report SARS, several countries did so ultimately. Scholars suggest that this unique international corporation would have failed without the complete involvement of the Chinese government, its citizens, and the medical personnel (Monaghan 13). Experts suggest that China's issues in confronting the SARS outbreak remained primarily founded on the organizational impediments. Most scientists claim that challenges, such as information flow through the administrative hierarchy, absence of synchronization among disjointed executive departments, and lack of political will created problems in handling the epidemic (Heymann and Rodier 194). However, these challenges did not affect only China and hinder the health care teams in responding to the outbreak, but affected most nations across the world.

The culture of China to respect senior scientists in power may have considerably impacted the conduct of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) of China and other scientists in the country. They got involved in the research on the virus (Monaghan 13). One of the respected Chinese scientists suggested that Chlamydia infection caused SARS. The scientist based the argument on an inspection of two samples. The discovery may have given China's Center for Disease Control and other scientists to believe that Chlamydia acted as an agent of SARS, despite other proof within China claiming that the agent that caused SARS existed as a virus (Huat 79). Besides, Beijing virologists desisted from proclaiming that they had discovered the agent causing SARS. The SARS outbreak exposed China's health care system's weaknesses, such as limited government financing, acute scarcities in facilities, inadequate health care personnel trained for a viral outbreak, and the absence of appropriate surveillance systems (Huat 79).

However, the United States' public health care experts and medical staff always mention these challenges when examining the state of readiness for an infectious disease epidemic. The United States must have gotten lucky in handling SARS (Monaghan 23). The Chinese government formulated a case reporting framework, enhanced its emergency response structure, outlaid principal officials that mishandled the outbreak during its early phases, and provided financial support for the control and prevention of the spread of SARS.

Economic Impact of SARS

The economic impact of the SARS epidemic remained high. The outbreak resulted in direct costs of acute health care and control involvements, truancy from work, extensive social interference, and economic loss. International travel, hotels, several businesses, and multinational industries suspended their operations (Monaghan 27). Hospitals, learning institutions, and several borders got closed, and a thousand individuals got quarantined. While the significant and immediate economic impact of SARS happened in Asia, almost all markets in the contemporary international economy got affected either indirectly or directly by the outbreak.

Most agencies and scholars have tried to approximate the cost of SARS founded on near-term expenses and losses in essential sectors of the economy, such as transport, investment, health, and consumer confidence (Monaghan 29). One model projected that the short-term worldwide cost of lost commercial activity due to SARS remained at around $80 billion. Economic experts agree that the actual financial effect of SARS remains unclear, predominantly due to the likelihood of its return (Huat 79). Due to its economic reliance on services, such as tourism and travel, the short-term impact of SARS affected Hong Kong.

Besides, the short-term losses accumulated in China due to a severe decline in foreign investment, a development that could get crippling if propagated for an extended period (Monaghan 29). After a long time, the prospect of persistent outbreaks of viral infections emanating from China may affect the whole Asian region in a long-lasting infection spread impact. The global economic impact of SARS remains at about $40 billion and maybe as high as $54 billion if financiers stay careful about the probability of future epidemics (Zhan 33). The cost of SARS may increase as a result of not supporting the public health system financially.

Experts warn of economic recess due to SARS or other outbreaks like COVID-19 that can crush the economy by squeezing funds meant for public health infrastructure. Such an infestation can further weaken the international's capacity to contain or prevent future pandemics (Zhan 35). Scholars suggest that further scrutiny comparing the expected costs connected with enhancing global and local public health frameworks. Measures like observation and response with the projected expenses of another outbreak, such as COVID-19, might expose considerable results to convince policy-makers to prioritize in investing in public health and research sectors.

Comparing SARS to COVID-19

The COVID-19 outbreak, first detected in China, quickly spread across 185 countries in various areas of the world. The disastrous effects of the virus have been headline-news for the more significant part of the year, with such reports as infection rates and death tolls. Besides, the spread of the virus has affected the global economy, with widespread impact on financial markets, business industries, oil prices, and much more (Monaghan 30). Looking at historical examples of previous pandemics, such as SARS, there exist more significant similarities.

Notably, the two infections exist as coronaviruses, and the public reaction remains quite similar to things like social distancing, wearing masks in public, quarantine, and the overall fear associated with the outbreak (Heymann and Rodier 195). Both the diseases started in Guangdong province in China, with the nature of their international spread bearing significant resemblance. Under the outbreak of both SARS and COVID-19, health workers got infected, schools got closed, and borders got closed. However, the nature of the response and containment of the disease differs.

China alerted the WHO in time to help the organization notify other countries of the outbreak of COVID-19. Measures to prevent the spread of the disease and contain it got drafted quickly. The aftermath of SARS saw an economic recovery that remains relatively rapid, with affected countries returning to pre-outbreak output and productivity within a few fiscal quarters (Heymann and Rodier 196). However, the SARS had an infection and death rate much smaller than COVID-19.